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Abstract 
In this paper we propose a metatheory, MT, which represents he computation which implements 
its object theory, OT, and, in particular, the computation which implements deduction in OT. To 
emphasize this fact we say that MT is a metutheory of a mechanized object theory. MT has 
some “unusual” properties, e.g. it explicitly represents failure in the application of inference 
rules, and the fact that large amounts of the code implementing OT are partial, i.e. they work 
only for a limited class of inputs. These properties allow us to use MT to express and prove 
tactics, i.e. expressions which specify how to compose possibly failing applications of inference 
rules, to interpret hem procedurally to assert heorems in OT, to compile them into the system 
implementation code, and, finally, to generate MT automatically from the system code. The 
definition of MT is part of a larger project which aims at the implementation of self-reflective 
systems, i.e. systems which are able to introspect their own code, to reason about it and, possibly, 
to extend or modify it. 
1. A metatheory of a mechanized object theory 
Since the seminal work by Goedel [28], metareasoning has been one of the most 
studied research topics in formal reasoning. Work has been done in mathematical ogic 
(e.g. [ 15,3,9,50] ), in philosophical logic (e.g. [ 41]), in logic programming (e.g. [ 5]), 
in many subfields of AI, such as mathematical reasoning (e.g. [ 11,541)) planning 
(e.g. [48] 11, programming languages (e.g. [47] ) and so on. These citations are by 
no means exhaustive. Our interests are in theorem proving with metatheories. Similar 
to previous work in automated deduction, we have mechanized an object theory OT 
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and its me&theory MT. The mechani~tion has been performed inside an interactive 
theorem prover called GETFOL [ 171. Unlike previous work, we have defined MT to be 
a metatheory that takes into account the fact that OT is mechanized. To emphasize this 
fact, we say that MT is a rnetatheory of a mechanized object theory, This requirement 
can be intuitively described as follows: 
l MT represents the computation which implements OT. 
The words “computation” and “represent” can be formally defined, even if this is 
not done in this paper (but see discussion in Section 9.6). In particular, GETFOL is 
developed in a LISP-like programming language called HGKM [ 19,49,X5]. Roughly 
speaking, by representability we mean that for any computation which can be per- 
formed by a (recursive) function in the code implementing OT, there is a deduction 
in MT of a corresponding “representing” formula, and vice versa. Thus, for instance, 
CONJ is the HGKM function in the implementation of OT such that (CONJ A) e TRUE 
or (CONJ A) 1ct FALSE depending on whether the formula A, recorded by the data 
structure A, is a conjunction, where --+ is the symbol for computation in HGKM. Then 
CONJ is represented in MT by the predicate symbol Conj such that hr Conj(“A”), 
where “A” is the name of A if A is a conjunction and br +Lmj(“A”) if this is 
false. 
MT has also been defined to be a metatheory of provability, i.e. to be about what is 
provable or not provable in OT. In this perspective the above requirement becomes: 
o MT represents the computation which implements deduction in OT. 
Thus, for instance, fandi is the HGKM function which implements in OT the in- 
ference rule performing conjunction introduction (as described in Section 5, GETFOL 
implements a sequent version of natural deduction [ 461). We have (f andi (GAMMAI, 
A) (GAMMA=!, B)) us (GAMMA1 GAMMA2, A AND B), where (GAMMAl, A), (GAMMAZ, 
B), (GAMMA1 GAMMAZ, A AND B) stand for the data structures recording the theorems 
rt +A, Tz -+B, rj, F2 -+ A A B of OT. Then fandi is represented in MT by a func- 
tion symbol fandi such that br fandi(“rl +A”, “T2 +B”) = “rl, rz +A A B”, 
where “r, + A”, “r2 + B”, “r,, r2 -+A A B” are the names in MT of the above 
theorems of OT. We have the further requirement that “rt, rz + A A B” is the unique 
constant for which the above equality holds. So far, we have considered successftd 
rule applications. However, inference rules are partial functions which can be applied 
only if certain preconditions are satisfied, e.g. it is impossible to apply a conjunc- 
tion elimination to a disjunction. This fact is left implicit in the definition on paper 
of a logic, but it is always implemented inside the code of theorem provers. It pre- 
vents them from asserting non-theorems. In the implementation of GETFOL, we have 
solved this problem by using a data structure for failure, fail and by defining new 
HGKM functions, called primitive tactics, which return the conclusion of the rules when 
these can be applied and fail when these cannot be applied. Primitive tactics imple- 
ment the total version of inference rules by returning an explicit failure. For instance, 
fandeltac returns the value returned by fandel (which implements left conjunction 
elimination) when fandel is defined, and f aif otherwise. Dually, in order to satisfy 
the requirement of representability, MT has a constant fail and new function sym- 
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bols, e.g. j’andeltac, with ~-M-I’ fandeltac( “r -? A A B”) = fandel( “r -+A A B”) and 
~~ fandeltac( “r -+ A V B”) = fail. 
2. Exploiting a metatheory of a mechanized object theory 
Since MT is a metatheory about deduction in a mechanized object theory, it has two 
main features: 
( 1) We can construct ground wffs and terms whose structure is in one to one cor- 
respondence with the (computation) tree constructed at the object level. In par- 
ticular, there are wffs, stating the provability of an object level theorem, whose 
structure can be put in one to one correspondence with the computation tree of 
the object level proof steps which prove the theorem itself, 
(2) The symbols occurring in such ground wffs and terms have corresponding sym- 
bolls in the underlying HGKM mechanization. In particular, this holds for function 
symbols representing inference rules and primitive tactics (e.g. fandeltac corre- 
sponds to fandeltac), for predicates r~pre~nting ~r~onditions to the appli- 
cability of inference rules (e.g. Conj corresponds to CONJ), and for constants 
denoting symbols of the language and theorems of OT (e.g. “A” corresponds to 
A). 
The firs{. feature makes it possible tv express and prove tactics, where by tactics we 
mean formulas of MT which specify how to compose primitive tactics (namely, possibly 
failing applications of object logic inference rules). Notice that in this paper, the word 
“tactic” has a different meaning from that used in most of the previous literature, e.g. in 
[ 14,3 I, 32,441, where tactics are programs written in a procedural metalanguage, e.g. 
in ML 1341. We call these latter tactics, program tactics. The second feature makes 
it possible to give tactics a procedural content, i.e. to use them to assert object level 
theorems (possibly proofs). This can be done in two ways. Tactics can be interpreted, 
i.e. they c,an be given as input to an interpreter which then asserts in OT the proved 
theorem. Tactics can also be compiled into HGKM code which can then be executed 
to prove theorems in CIT. This process of compilation is called fattening. Finally, the 
combination of the first and the second features makes it possible to define a process, 
called lifting, which can be intuitively seen as the reverse of flattening, and which allows 
us to generate MT (its language and axioms) starting from the code implementing OT. 
It has therefore been possible to define and implement a process where the metatheory 
is lifted from the code, and it is used to prove theorems representing interesting tactics 
which are then compiled down, or possibly interpreted in the code. As a result, derived 
rules can be executed like the rest of the system and used to shorten subsequent proofs. 
Logical manipulation at the theory level corresponds to program transformation at the 
system level. This reasoning cycle, which can be iterated, is schematically represented 
in Fig, 1 (this figure was first presented in [4] >. This approach provides considerable 
efficiency advantages. From a computational point of view, a metatheory of a mecha- 
nized object theory allows us to compose inside a unified environment the output of 
code writing and me&theoretic theorem proving. From an intellectual point of view, it 
allows us to bridge in practice, that is inside a real inning system, the gap between 
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GETFOL METATHEORY 
‘____~___“__“______~____________.___________~____________~_~______________~______~_~__, 
Metalevel Theorem Proving 
Safe System Extension 
I.._____________________________________~~~~_~___________~__~~_~_~__________~__________. 
GETFOL SYSTEM CODE 
Fig. I. The lifting-reasoning-flattening cycle. 
deduction and the computation which implements deduction. This seems a first step 
towards “really” self-reflective systems, i.e. systems able to reason deductively about 
and thus, possibly, extend or modify, their underlying reasoning strategies in a provably 
correct way. 
3. The project 
This project builds on and extends Richard Weyhrauch’s work on the FOL system, 
in particular his work on Meta, reflection principles, and simulation structures (where, 
using Weyhrauch’s terminology, simulation structures are the mechanizable analogue 
of the notion of model) [ 541. It can be described as an attempt to push the idea of 
linking computation in the code of a mechanized system and deduction in the system 
itself. From an implementational point of view, GETFOL has been developed on top of a 
reimplementation of the FOL system, described in [ 271. GETFOL has, with minor vari- 
ations, all the functionalities of FOL plus extensions, some described here, to allow for 
metatheoretic theorem proving. From a conceptual point of view, the close connection 
with Weyhrauch’s work can be seen by analyzing the relation between UT, its mech- 
anization, and MT, as shown in Fig. 2. MT is a metatheory of UT by construction. 
The code mechanizes OT by construction. The code of CYT has been developed to be 
a finite (and partial) presentation of the model of MT, this achieves the requirement 
that MT represents the computation which implements OT. In fact, as described more 
in detail in Sections 6 and 9.1, this amounts to the following two facts. First, the in- 
terpreted constants in MT denote objects of OT which are recorded in the HGKM data 
structures implementing UT. Thus, for instance, “A A B”, “rl, r2 + A AB” denote A A B, 
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MT = Metatheory( OT ) 
Code = Model( MT ) 
Code = Mechanization( OT ) 
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Fig. 2. OT, MT and the code. 
r, , r2 +A A B, as recorded by the data structures (A AND B), (GAMMA1 GAMMA2, A 
AND B) , respectively. Second, the interpreted function and predicate symbols of MT cor- 
respond to HGKM function symbols which compute their set-theoretic meaning. In other 
words, HGKM functions are finite presentations of the interpretations of the corresponding 
application symbols in MT. Thus, for instance, the extension of fund&m is computed, 
via the HGKM evaluator, by fandeltac. 
However the idea of having a metatheory of a mechanized object theory is new, as 
are the ideas of performing lifting, flattening and of using MT for synthesizing tactics. 
Indeed, even though FOL had a preliminary version of the tactic interpreter (described in 
[ 541 and more in detail in [ 23]), FOL was never developed to the point where its code 
could be directly used in the metatheory, for instance to perform tactic interpretation. 
Most of the examples which can be found in the literature required some (often minor) 
ad hoc and dedicated coding. Finally, unlike Weyhrauch’s metatheories (e.g. in [ 26,54, 
55]), we have proved the correctness of MT and of the use of the simulation structure 
machinery. We have in fact shown that MT, OT and its mechanization, the lifting, 
flattening and interpretation processes are such that tactics, when executed, will not 
assert non-theorems, under the hypothesis that the underlying implementation is correct 
(see discussion in Section 9.6). 
Starting from the complete reimplementation of the FOL system described in [ 271, this 
project has been developed as two parallel subprojects strongly influencing each other. 
The goal of the first subproject was the mechanization of CYI, i.e. the production of code 
which implements OT and which, at the same time, constitutes a finite presentation of 
the model of MT. The goal of the second project was the development of MT. These 
two projects have influenced each other in the sense that the mapping from computation 
to deductimon and vice versa (and, as a consequence, e.g. the kind of tactics which can 
be written, how they can be executed and also the definition of the lifting and flattening 
functions) depends on the precise form of the axioms of MT and of the HGKM functions 
mechanizing OT. The problem we had to face many times was that it was impossible 
to map MT into the code, and vice versa. This has required multiple major recodings 
of GETFOL (which is more than one megabyte of code) and redefinitions of MT. The 
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interesting and difficult question we had to answer any time this happened was which 
between MT and the code had to be modified, and how. The constraint on the code is 
that it must do what it is supposed to do, e.g., test for theoremhood, assert a theorem, 
compute a conjunction, e$i%ziently. It is our committment not to develop GETFOL as 
a toy implementation. The constraint on MT is that it must be usable effectively, for 
example, to prove theoremhood of object level theorems, synthesize tactics, reason about 
the structure of wffs. Currently we have succeeded in defining a metatheory MT with 
all the desired properties and, therefore, we have also formulated a general schema to 
be followed when writing the code mechanizing OT. We have recoded all of GETFOL 
according to this general schema. This (very slowly converging) process has lead to 
a situation where large parts of the code of GETFOL are really like (and look alike) 
axioms, and where MT contains only the necessary facts needed to prove and execute 
tactics. 
4. Contents of the paper 
The goal of this paper is to describe MT, the sense that it is a metatheory of a 
mechanized object theory, and the extent to which it achieves the goals described above. 
The details of the implementation of GETFOL are discussed only for what is needed 
to understand MT. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 5 we describe OT 
and its mechanization. This material is then used in Section 6 to describe MT, its 
mechanization and its connection with the code mechanizing OT. In Section 7 we show 
how MT can express and prove tactics. In Section 8 we show that tactics can be given 
a procedural interpretation by either interpreting or compiling them into the code of 
GETFOL. In Section 9 we give some technical results, i.e. some theorems that guarantee 
the correctness of our approach. The tactics considered in this paper are very simple. In 
Section 10 we discuss further work aimed at giving MT the desired expressibility and 
reasoning capabilities. In Section 11 we discuss the related work. 
5. OT and its mechanization 
The object theory OT is a triple OT = (&A_x,R), where L, dx and R are the 
language, the set of axioms and the set of inference rules of OT, respectively. OT is a 
first order classical natural deduction (ND) calculus. We consider the inference rules 
for A, >, V and I, as shown in Fig. 3 (A, B, C, . . . are well formed formulas, 1A is an 
abbreviation for A 3 I). The implementation of OT in GETFOL allows for a richer set 
of rules which contains rules for other connectives, rules for equality, derived inference 
rules, monadic deciders, tautology checkers, a rewriter, a semantic simplifier. Definitions 
and results can be easily generalized. 
For various reasons, e.g. efficiency of the implementation and elegance of the proof 
theory, GETFOL keeps the dependencies locally to formulas. This allows one to see 
the GETFOL rules as rules on sequents with introduction and elimination in the post 
sequent. Fig. 4 describes the rules of Fig. 3 in sequent notation (r, A,. . . are finite 
sets of formulas). (Notice that, of the structural rules, interchange and contraction are 
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VI has the restriction that a must not occur in any assumption A depends on. 
Fig. 3. OT inference rules presented in ND form. 
Al) 
rdA AdB 
r,A+AAB 
AE) r+AAB 1 
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VI x’ a) 
r-A r --+VxA 
r +VxA”, V’Ext) r--,A; 
J-C) 
T,A>_L +I 
r-A 
where VI has the restriction that a must not occur in r. 
Fig. 4. OT inference rules presented in sequent form. 
not needed as we have sets, while weakening and cut are derived inference rules.) 
Technically, by sequent we mean a pair (r, A), also written r -+ A, where A is the 
“formula of the sequent” and r is the set of “dependencies of the sequent”. Assumptions 
are sequems of the form A + A. We suppose that > I always discharges the assumption 
A (see Fig. 4). This can be easily generalized. 
We take the notion of deduction defined in [46]. When talking about OT, we also 
call a deduction of a formula A depending on the possibly empty set r of formulae, 
a proof (tree) of the sequent r + A. We say that r + A is a theorem of OT, or that 
r +A is provable in OT, if and only if there exists a proof (in OT) of r + A. We 
write b-r 1’ + A to mean that r + A is provable in OT. 
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GETFOL’s top level implements a listen-act-respond loop. It keeps, as part of its internal 
state, the proof built so far, i.e. the proved theorems and the reason why they have 
been proved. The proof can be inspected and manipulated by the user (via appropriate 
correctness preserving operations). When the action requested by the user is an inference 
rule application, GETFOL applies the rule, produces an error message if it fails, and it 
adds the proved theorem to the current proof otherwise. The details of the mechanization 
of GETFOL will be given in a following paper. A somewhat detailed but still incomplete 
description can be found in [ 201. Here we mention only the relevant issues. A first issue 
is how to separate the code mechanizing the logic from the rest (e.g. I/O, statistics, 
administration facilities). A second issue is that MT must describe a subset (possibly 
changing for different applications) of the system functionalities and inference rules, 
and at the appropriate level of abstraction. Thus, for instance, it must be possible to 
consider only the code implementing the decision procedures without considering the 
code implementing natural deduction, or vice versa, or it must be possible to consider 
both. As a second example, when reasoning about proofs, whether wffs are implemented 
using pairs or lists is irrelevant. More interestingly, as Sections 6 and 7 will make clear, 
synthesizing tactics does not require an explicit axiomatization of what it means to be a 
wff. Finally, GETFOL has a lot of state (e.g. the proved theorems) which must be taken 
into account inside MT and, in particular, when lifting MT. 
For the goals of this paper, it is sufficient to see in some detail the implementation of 
the inference rules. Consider for instance the GETFOL implementation of AE!, as reported 
in Figs. 5, 6 and 7. All the inference rules in GETFOL, also including the deciders, have 
been developed according to the general schema described in the Figs. 5, 6 and 7. 
This schema is idealized in the sense that it does not consider a lot of low level 
implementational or inessential details (e.g. the fact that the code has many failures, 
each recording the reason why it has been generated). However it is completely faithful 
to the link between MT and the HGKM code, e.g. function names, function calls, parameter 
passing, access to state. 
Let us start with the code in Fig. 5. All this code is functional, i.e. it does not 
read nor access state. The code of this kind is called “computation machinery”. AEl is 
implemented by f andel. fandel never returns fail. fandeltac is the corresponding 
primitive tactic. Inference rules and primitive tactics are uniformly typed in the sense 
that they take as input the same types of objects they produce in output. Thus fandel 
takes a theorem (a fact in our terminology) and returns a theorem while f andeltac 
takes a theorem or a failure (a tat in our terminology) and returns a theorem or a 
failure. 
Fig. 6 reports the code modifying the state of the system, i.e. tacfproof -update and 
fproof -update. Code of this kind is called “update machinery”. tacfproof-update 
updates that part of the state which keeps the theorems and the failures generated so far, 
via a function call to f proof -update and one to tacf proof -add-tat (which updates 
the stack of theorems and failures to be processed by the current program tactic). 
fproof -update updates the current proof, via a function call to fproof-add-fact 
(which updates the current proof) or updates the standard output, via a function call 
to print-error-message (which prints an error message in the user defined standard 
output). 
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(DEFLAM f andeltac (tat) 
(IF (NOT (FAIL tat>> 
(f andel ! tat) 
fail)) 
(DEFLAM f andel ! (fact) 
(IF (CONJ fact) 
(f andel fact) 
fail) 
(DEFLAM f andel (fact) 
(f act-mak (lfaud (f act-get-wff fact)) 
(f act-get-deplist fact) ) > 
Fig. 5. Computation machinery for left conjunction elimination. 
(DEFLAM tacfproof -update (tat) 
(SEQ 
(tacfproof -add-tat tat) 
(fproof -update tat) > 1 
(DEFLAM fproof-update (tat) 
(IF (FAIL tat) 
(print-error-message tat) 
(f proof -add-f act tat) ) ) 
Fig. 6. Update machinery for proof state and I/O state. 
The code implementing the computation and the update machinery is called by the 
code implementing the user interface (see Fig. 7). Code of this kind is called “top level 
machinery”. FANDEL# is called when the following command is typed to the GETFOL 
prompt. 
GETFOL: : FANDEL <fact-name> ; 
GETFOL: : is printed by the system. The top level, once parsed FANDEL, understands 
that the user wants to apply AEl and activates the routine implementing it, i.e. FANDELK 
FACT# parses a fact from the standard input, or it aborts if this is not possible. FANDEL# 
calls fandel! (and not faudeltac) as FACT# never returns a failure. Dually, FANDEL 
is called by the program tactic interpreter; TAC extracts the “current” object (a failure 
or a theorem) from the data structure recording the objects which must be processed by 
the program tactic being executed, or it aborts if this is not possible. 
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(DEFLAM FANDEL 0 
(tacfproof -update (fandeltac (TAC) > > > 
(DEFLAM FANDEL# 0 
(fproof-update (fandel! (FACT#))) > 
Fig. 7. Top level user controlled machinery for left conjunction elimination. 
6. MT and its mechanization 
MT and OT are two distinct theories. Their implementation within GETFOL exploits 
the GETFOL’s multitheory facilities [ 171. MT is a triple MT = (ML, Mdx, MR) where 
ML, Mdx and MR are the language, the set of axioms and the set of inference rules 
of MT, respectively. MT is a first order classical ND calculus. If LY is a formula of MT, 
then br LY means that (Y is provable in MT (is a theorem of MT). In the following 
of this section we describe ML, Mdx, MR. In order to keep the paper shorter, we 
consider the axiomatization of only two inference rules of OT, namely A& and VZ. A 
complete definition of ML and Mdx is given in Appendix A. 
6.1. The language ML 
Let us start with the individual constants. In MT it must be possible to refer to certain 
objects of OT. We do this by adding to ML a new individual constant for any object 
of OT. These constants are the “quotation mark names” of the objects of OT [24] and 
are written by surrounding the string representing an object with double quotes. Thus, 
for instance, the quotation mark name of the individual constant c is “c”, that of the 
individual variable x is “x”, that of the formula VxA is “VxA”, that of the sequent 
r +A is “r +A”. In this paper we use names only for sequents, terms, variables, 
individual parameters and constants of OT (from now on, called generically “objects 
(of OT)“), which we write as s, t, x, a and c, respectively. In ML, we have also a 
constant fail which denotes failure, as recorded by the data structure fail (see Fig. 5). 
fail is not the quotation mark name of an object of CYT. However, analogously to all 
the other constants of MT, it corresponds to a data structure manipulated by the code 
mechanizing OT. For each inference rule and corresponding primitive tactic of OT we 
have an appropriate function symbol in MT: 
AEi : fandel,fandeltac of arity 1, 
bfl : falli,fallitac of arity 3. 
Analogously to what happens for all the other inference rules, fandel and fandeltac 
correspond to the HGKM functions fandel and f andeltac (see Fig. 5). ML has a 
predicate = for equality, a unary predicate Set which holds of sequents, a unary predicate 
T for theoremhood, a unary predicate Fail which holds of fail, a predicate Tat which 
holds of fail and the theorems of OT, and 
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l\E, : Conj of arity 1, 
VI : Pur of arity 1, 
VI : K2r of arity 1, 
VI : NoFree of arity 2. 
As for al.1 the other preconditions reified in the HGKM code, Conj corresponds to 
the HGKM boolean function CONJ; Fail corresponds to FAIL (see Fig. 5). Finally, ML 
contains the sentential constants T (which is also an axiom) and I for truth and falsity, 
respectively. MC has also individual variables and parameters written x, XI, x2 . . . and 
a,al,a;?. . . respectively. The context always makes clear whether we are talking of 
variables and parameters of OT or of MT. Finally, MC contains the conditional term 
constructors if A then t] else t2, where A is a wff and tt , t2 are terms. (We write 
if then else in boldface to increase the readability of formulas.) 
Within GE:TFOL, the correspondence between the HGKM data structures and functions 
and the (individual, functional, predicative) constants of MT is constructed by using the 
simulation structure machinery and, in particular, the commands ATTACH and MATTACH 
(described in [ 17,541). As described in detail in [ 541 and hinted in Section 3, the 
simulation structure machinery allows the user to define and use, within the system, a 
finite presemation of a model of the theory under consideration. ATTACH and MATTACH, in 
particular, implement the (mechanizable analogue) of the model interpretation function 
g [ 131. MATTACH takes a pointer (abstractly defined) to the data structure m recording 
the constant m of MT and a pointer (abstractly defined) to the data structure o recording 
the object o of OT and stores the pair (m, o) as part of the state of the system. The idea 
is that the pair (m, o) records the fact that g(m) = o. Thus, if m is the individual constant 
“o”, then the pair (“o”, o) records the fact that “0” is the (quotation) mark name of 
o. Analgously, if m is the applicational (functional or predicative) symbol fm, then the 
pair (f m, f o) , where f o is an HGKM function symbol, records the fact that the extensional 
(set-theoretic) characterization of f o is the interpretation of fm. Following Weyhrauch’s 
terminology, we call the pair (m, o) an attachment pair, or simply an attachment, and 
we say that m is attached to o. 
6.2. The axioms MAX 
The axioms of MT have been devised to be lifted from the mechanization of OT. 
However the mechanization is based on two implicit assumptions which make everything 
work correctly, namely that no sequent is equal to fail and that all theorems are 
sequents. 
Vx T(sec(x> A Fail(x)), (1) 
Vx (T(x) >Sec(x)). (2) 
FAIL is implemented as an HGKM boolean function which returns TRUE when its 
argument computes fail and FALSE otherwise. We can therefore lift the following 
definition of Fail. 
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Vx (Fail(x) ++ x =fail). (3) 
Consider the computation machinery (Fig. 5). f andel is a partial function and it is 
called by f andeltac only with sequents whose wff is a conjunction. In practice, f andel 
is implemented (roughly speaking) as an HGKM CAR (which behaves the same as the 
LISP CAR). Thus, if it is applied to sequents whose wff is not a conjunction, fandel 
may return a wrong value (e.g. with AVB, the left disjunct A) or it may even abort (e.g. 
any time its argument is an HGKM atom). For all the inputs where f andel is not defined, 
fandeltac returns fail. In order to guarantee the correctness of the implementation, 
f andel never returns fail. This fact is captured by the following axioms. 
V.x 7 fandel( x) = fail, (4) 
Vx1Vx2Vx3 7 falli(xl ,x2, x3) = fail. (5) 
All the computation machinery (which, as pointed out in Section 5, is functional) is 
basically lifted to MT with a one to one mapping. This generates the following axioms. 
vx (TaC(Xl) > 
fandeltac(x~) = if +ail(xl) A Conj(x,) 
then fan&& x1 ) 
else fail ) 
(6) 
vx,vx2vx3 (72X(x,) 3 
fallitac( XI, x2, x3 ) 
= if -+ail(xl) A Var(x2) APar(x3) ANoFree(x3,x~) 
then fafli( XI , x2, x3 ) 
else fail ) 
(7) 
Notice that fandeltac is defined in terms of the function fandel!, which, on the 
other hand, has no corresponding symbol fandel! in MT. Indeed, in the lifting, f andel ! 
is unfolded into its definiendum. An explicit definition of fundel! is useless for our goals 
as f andel! takes a fact and returns a tat and cannot be uniformly composed with 
other functions which take and produce objects of the same kind. (It is not hard to 
think of possible applications of fandel!, however, this is not one of our current goals.) 
Notice also that fandeltac is applied to objects returned by TAC. This generates the 
hypothesis 7&(x,) in axioms (6) and (7). 
Consider the update machinery (Fig. 6). tacfproof -update updates that part of 
the state of GETFOL which stores the theorems and the failures generated so far. Dually, 
TAC (whose definition has not been given because it is not relevant) extracts objects 
from the system state updated by tacfproof -update. This part of the state of GETFOL 
approximates (in the sense that it contains a subset of) the (non-recursive) set of 
objects represented in MT by Tat (namely the set of theorems of OT union failure, see 
Section 9.1) . This causes the lifting of tacfproof -update and TAC to Tat. This form 
of lifting can be done in general. For instance it applies also to fproof -add-f act and 
FACT#, which are both lifted to T. In fact fproof -add-fact adds its argument to a 
global variable which stores the current proof, i.e. the theorems proved so far. This global 
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variable approximates the (non-recursive) set of theorems of UI, represented in MT 
by T (see Section 9.1). The intuition is that the operations that read and update some 
part of the system state which approximates a given set must be lifted to the symbol 
representing such set. However this does not mean that f proof -add-f act or FACT# are 
(the finite ,presentation of) the interpretation of T or that tacfproof-update or TAC 
are (the finite presentation of) the interpretation of Tat. In fact none of them is attached 
to T or Tat (see Section 6.1) . The fact that, for instance, FACT# aborts for some object, 
does not mean that the object is not a theorem. It might simply be a theorem which 
has not yet been proved. Within fproof -update (and also tacfproof -update) we 
have two possibilities. Either print-error-message is called, i.e. we have a failure, 
or f proof --add-f act is called. This generates the following axiom. 
‘v’x (Tczc(x) H T(x) V Fail(x)). (8) 
Consider the top level machinery (Fig. 7). Once understood how to lift the update 
machinery, the lifting of the top level machinery becomes a one to one mapping. Thus 
FANDEL and FALL1 (which is defined analogously to FANDEL) are lifted to the following 
axioms. (FANDEL#, which could be lifted very much in the same way, has not been lifted 
for the same reasons as f andel ! ‘s.) 
‘dx (k(x) > Tac(fandeZtac( x) ) ) , (9) 
Vx~‘v’x2b’x~ (Tac(xl) > TaccfafZitac(x~,x2,~3))) (10) 
Finally, ‘we have to describe the base case for deductions. Let A and B be wffs of 
OT. 
T(“A +A”), (11) 
T(” -+A”), if --*A E Ax. (12) 
The above axioms describe deduction in OT and, as discussed in Section 7, allow us 
to express and synthesize tactics. However MT must also have axioms describing the 
syntax of OT, and the syntactic manipulation performed by the basic inference rules. In 
principle, we could generate such axioms following the same methodology used to lift 
the axioms above. This would allow us to use and prove universal statements about the 
syntax of OT, e.g. about what it means to be a well formed formula of OT. However 
the main goal of MT is to reason about tactics and, in particular for what concerns 
the syntax of OT, to be able to discriminate between when a tactic, applied to some 
arguments, fails or succeeds. In this perspective, as Section 9.3 will show, it is sufficient 
to have the ground version of such axioms and of all their consequences. Let a and x 
be any individual parameter and variable of OT, A and B be wffs of OT, r be a finite 
set of formulas of CYT, c be any individual constant of OT and 5 be any object of OT. 
Then the following are axioms of MT. 
fandei’( “r + A A B”) = “r + A” (13) 
falli( “r + A 31, bGx’_, (cay = ssr +vxA;“, where a does not occur in r (14) 
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Par( “a”) 
TPar( c) , if c is fail or “5” and 5 is not an individual parameter of (YT 
Var( “.a?‘) 
-Var(c), if c is fail or “5” and 5 is not an individual variable of OT 
1 Cl =c2, if ci and c:! are distinct individual constants 
Conj( “r + A A B”) 
-Conj( “I- + A”) , if A is not a conjunction 
NoFree( “a”, “r --) A”), if a does not appear in r 
TNoFree( “a”, “I’ + A”), if a appears in r 
&c( “r + A”) 
+ec( “c’), if 5 is not a sequent of OT 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
( 1 1 )-( 25) represent an infinite set of ground axioms. This is not a problem as in the 
actual mechanization of MT such axioms are really never asserted. For what concerns 
axioms ( 13)-( 25) (and all their (ground) consequences e.g. Conj(fandel( “ * (A A 
B) A C”))), the idea is to use the simulation structure machinery and to exploit the 
fact that the code implementing OT is a finite presentation of the model of MT. This 
is achieved through the command SIMPLIFY. SIMPLIFY takes in input a term or a wff 
and, as a first step, it computes the value denoted in the defined model (as constructed 
by the set of attachments, see Section 6.1). In the case of a term, the denoted value is 
an element of the domain, therefore SIMPLIFY asserts in MT the equality between its 
quotation mark name and the input term itself. In the case of a wff, the denoted value 
is FALSE or TRUE; in the first case SIMPLIFY asserts in MT the input wff itself, in the 
second, its negation. Axioms ( 11) and ( 12) cannot be asserted using SIMPLIFY, since, 
as seen in Section 6.1, T is not attached to any HGKM function (the reason being that T 
should have to be attached to a theorem prover complete for first order logic. However 
this would make us lose the termination of SIMPLIFY, and we want to avoid this). They 
are asserted by exploiting the fact that for any theorem s of OT (and, as a particular 
case, for any axiom and assumption) we have br T( “s”). This is explained in detail 
in Section 9.3. 
Notice that an object level sequent (e.g. +A) is denoted in MT by its quotation mark 
name (e.g. “ +A”) and by other terms that can be proved equal to its quotation mark 
name (e.g. fandef( “ -+ A A II”)). We call the set of complex terms that are provably 
equal to the quotation mark name of an object of CYT, the structural descriptive names 
of such object. In particular, an object level theorem can be given a structural descriptive 
name for each proof proving it. For instance, fandel(“ *A A II”) expresses the fact 
that ---) A can be obtained by applying A& to + A A B. Another structural descriptive 
name of 4A is fandel(fandi( “ +A”, “ + B”) ) where fandi builds the conjunction 
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of two sequents. Notice moreover that writing quotation mark names using quotation 
marks is an option. GETFOL has no hardwired naming machinery. Using MATTACH and 
SIMPLIFY it is possible to give any object in OT the desired quotation mark and 
structural descriptive names (all the structural descriptive names being provably equal 
to their corresponding quotation mark name). Finally, notice that naming in GETFOL is 
done very efficiently, amounting to a simple table lookup in the case of quotation mark 
names and taking linear time in their length in the case of structural descriptive names. 
To conclude, it is important to notice that MT does not represent all the code of OT 
but only th.e small part that it reasons about. In particular it is possible to lift only a 
subset of the inference rules implemented in GETFOL. This feature is quite useful as it 
allows one to use the code as a storage of axioms and to extract them selectively. 
Let us consider now some examples of use of the simulation structure machinery. In 
all the examples of this paper we take r as a shorthand for Vx( A( x) A B(x) ) ; s as a 
shorthand for the assumption Vx(A(x) AB(x)) dVx(A(x) AB(x)); A as a shorthand 
of Vx(A(x) 3 B(x)); s’ as a shorthand of Vx(A(x) 1 B(x)) +Vx(A(x) > B(x)). 
Example 6.1. Let us consider the following term: 
fulli(jhdef(fulle( “s”, “x”, “a”) ) , “x”, “u”). (26) 
From axiorns (13) and ( 14) (see also axiom aboutfulle in Appendix A) we can prove 
fulli(f;zndeZ(falle( I‘s”, “x”, “a”) ) , “x”, “u”) = “r -+VxA( x)” (27) 
by theorem proving in MT. The same result can be achieved with SIMPLIFY. The 
command SIMPLIFY, when executed over (26)) runs a routine, called simplify, which 
returns the interpretation of the input expression (e.g. a term, a wff) in the defined 
model. 
simplif yCfalli~undelCfulle( “r +Vx( A(x) A B(x) )“, “x”, “#) ), “x”, GL#) 
= (simplify(falli) simplifyCfandel(&lle(. . .))) 
simplif y( “x”) simplif y( “a”)) 
= (SimplifyCfalli) (simplify(@ndel) simplifyCfaUe(. . .))> 
simplify(“x”) simplify(“u”)) 
= (simplif y(fulli) (simplif yCfandel) ( 
SimplifyCfalle) simplify(“r +Vx(A(x) A B(X))“) 
simplif y( “x”) simplif y( “u”))) simplif y( “x") simplify( “a")) 
= (simplif y(falli) (simplif y(fundel) ( 
falle r+Vx(A(x) A B(x)) x a)) simplify(“x”) simplify(“u”)) 
= (simplify@lli) (simplify(fundel) r *A(a) A B(U)) 
simplif y( “x”) simplif y( “u”) > 
= (simplify@lli) (fandel r +A(u) A B(U)) 
simplify( “x”) simplify(“u”)) 
= (simplify&Eli) r dA(u) simplify(“x”) simplify(“u”)) 
= (falli T+A(u) x a) 
= l’+VxA(x) 
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SIMPLIFY computes the quotation mark name of the expression computed by simplify, 
in this case “f +‘dxA(x)“, and asserts its equality with the input term as a theorem 
of MT, in this case (27). 
Example 6.2. The functions occurring in (26) are partial. As a consequence, SIMPLIFY 
can be applied only to arguments where these functions are defined. To take into account 
failure, SIMPLIFY must be executed over terms containing primitive tactics. 
simplif yCfalfituc(fundeltuc(falletuc( “s’“, “x”, “~2”) ) , “x”, “u”) ) 
= simplif yCfullituc(jundeltuc( “A + A (a) > B(u) “) , “x”, “u”) ) 
= simplif ycfallituccfuil, “x”, “a”) ) 
= fail 
Therefore, SIMPLIFY, asserts the following theorem in MT: 
fullituc(fandeltuc(jXetac( “s”‘, “x”, “~2’) , “x”, “u”) = fail 
Example 6.3. In MT we can prove the following wff. 
Xonj(falle( “s”‘, “x”, “u”) ) 
We execute SIMPLIFY over Conjvalle( “s”‘, “x”, “a”) ). 
simplif y( ConjCfaUe( “s”‘, “x”, “u”) ) ) 
= simplify(Conj(“A+A(u) > B(a)“)) 
= FALSE 
(28) 
Since simplify returns FALSE, then SIMPLIFY asserts the negation of the input wff, in 
this case (28). 
6.3. The rules MR 
The set of rules of MT, MR consists of the same rules as OT, described in Fig. 
3, for the language ML plus a sound and complete set of rules for equality and the 
rules for the introduction and elimination of conditional terms, reported in Fig. 8. Rule 
if E [if E,] states that from P (if A then tl else t2) and A [ TA], we can derive P (tl ) 
[ P( rz)]. Rule if I states that, given a deduction of P( tl) from A and a deduction of 
P(t2) from -A, we can prove P(if A then tl else t2) ([A] denotes the fact that A is 
discharged from the set of wffs the conclusion depends on). The resulting theory is a 
conservative extension of MT [ I]. 
7. Expressing and proving tactics 
Program tactics are programs which generate proofs. They may involve any pro- 
gramming control construct (e.g. conditionals, loops, calls to defined program tactics). 
Moreover, complex program tactics are often constructed using tacticals (see for in- 
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[Al [TAI A B(if A then tl else t2) 
B(tl) 
if E 
B(tl) B(k) 
if I 
B(if A then tl else t2) 
TA B(if A then tl else t2) if E 
B(t2) 
-l 
Fig. 8. Conditional inference rules. 
stance [ 14,32,43] ). In this paper we focus on a limited class of program tactics, i.e. 
those that express a finite composition of proof steps. We show that 
( 1) there exist wffs of MT which can be put in isomorphic correspondence with 
program tactics, and that 
(2) these wffs can be proved by building proofs where each proof step corresponds 
to a computation step of the program tactic. 
We call these wffs, tactics. 
7.1. Expressing tactics 
Program tactics build trees of object level inference rule applications (called sequent 
trees) where either all the rules are applicable (the program tactic succeeds) or there 
is a rule which is not applicable (the program tactic fails). Sequent trees are formally 
defined as follows. 
Definition 7.1 (Sequent tree of s). A sequent tree of a sequent s is defined inductively 
as follows: 
( 1) Base. For any sequent s, s is a sequent tree of s; 
(2) Step. We have one case for each inference rule. Let 171,. . . ,Z7” be sequent trees 
of SI,. . . , s, respectively. Let p be an n-ary inference rule. Then 
n1 . . . 17, 
SI . . . sn 
is a sequent tree of S, where s is the conclusion of the application of p if p is 
applicable, or “ + I” otherwise. 
We use leaf and end sequent of a sequent tree with the usual meaning. In item (2) 
of Definition 7.1, when p is not applicable, we add + 1. The particular form of this 
sequent is irrelevant. We represent inference rule applications in the following uniform 
way. 
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We call I7 the sequent tree of s built by applying an inference rule to the end sequent 
sr of 171. We associate to every OT sequent tree I7 (I71 ) a tactic term r, (T,,). Tactic 
terms are defined inductively over the structure of sequent trees. 
Definition 7.2 (Tactic term of I7). The tactic term rn of the sequent tree I7 of s is 
defined inductively over the structure of ZI. 
( I ) Base. 
r57 = C 
“S” 
fail: 
if s is an assumption or an axiom, 
otherwise. 
(2) Step. 
(a) ( AE/) : T, =fundeltuc( T,, ), 
(b) (V’lxu) : T, =fullituc( T,, , “x”, “u”). 
Example 7.3. Let us consider the following proof tree Ii’ (the axioms for VE are in 
Appendix A) : 
VE 
l- +VxA(x) A B(x) 
AEl 
l- *A(u) A B(a) 
VI 
I- +A(u) 
l- +VxA(x) 
r, is jiilfitucCfundeftuc(jMetuc( “s”, “x”, “a”) ) , “a?, “u”), 
Example 7.4. Let us consider the following sequent tree I7 (notice that X7 is not a 
proof tree) : 
VE 
A+VxA(x) > B(x) 
A-5 
A+A(u) > B(u) 
VI 
+I 
+vx I 
T, is fallitucCfandeltucCfulletuc( “s”‘, “x”, “a”) ) , “x”, “a”). 
Tactic terms contain constants which denote either the leaves of the corresponding 
sequent tree or failure. Program tactics, however, take arguments which get instantiated 
at execution time. We are therefore interested in a “generalization” of tactic terms, where 
constants are replaced by variables, and which represent proof structures independently 
of the leaves of sequent trees. Technically, this is obtained as follows. We write tactic 
termsr,asr,[ct,...,c,],wherect , . . . , c, are the individual constants appearing in the 
term. Each c; in cl,. . . , c, may be the quotation mark name of a sequent, the constant 
fail, or the quotation mark name of a possible parameter of a rule application (like 
“a? and “a” in fullituc( “s”, “x”, “u”) ). Let xl,. . . ,x, be individual variables of MT. 
By r,r[x~,.. . ,x,] we mean the term obtained by replacing the constants cl,. . . , c, in 
77r[Cl,..., c,] with the variables xl, . . . , x,, respectively. We can now define the notion 
of tactic. 
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Definition 7.5 (Tactic). Let cl,. . . , c, be constants and r,[ct , . . . , c,] a tactic term. 
Let cl,. . . ,cn,, with m < n, be all and the only constants in cl,. . . , cn that are either 
quotation mark names of sequents or fail. Then a tactic is any wff of the form: 
V’x, . ..vx,, (Tac(x,) A~~~ATaC(.x,,) 3 TaC(T,[Xl,..., x,])). (29) 
Axioms (9) and ( 10) are tactics. In Section 6 we have explained how they are 
in a precise: correspondence with the primitive tactics for AEI and MI. The same cor- 
respondence exists in general between complex program tactics and tactics. Indeed, 
each function symbol in T,[ xi, . . . , x,] corresponds to a primitive tactic. Consider for 
instance the: following example. 
Example 7.6. 
b”xlx2.q (Tac( XI > > TucCfalfitucCfandeltuc(tXetuc( XI, x2, XX) ) , x2, x3) ) ) . (30) 
(30) corre:sponds to the program tactic that composes the three primitive tactics 
f alletac, f andeltac and fallitac. 
7.2. Proving tactics 
Tactics which correspond to primitive tactics are axioms of MT. From these axioms 
we can prove tactics which correspond to compositions of primitive tactics. 
Example 7,.7. Consider tactic (30). From the following axiom of MT (see Appendix 
A) 
YIX,VX:!VX~ (Tuc(xl) > Tuc(fulletuc(xl,x2,x3))) 
and axiom (9) we can prove 
(31) 
Vx,Vx:,V’x3 (Tuc( xl ) > TucCfandeltucCfalletuc( x1, x2, x3)))). (32) 
Then, from (32) and axiom ( 10) we can prove (30). Notice that the proof starts 
from wff (3 1) which corresponds to f alletac. It then introduces fundeltuc and finally 
fullituc. 
The proof in Example 7.7 suggests one possible general way to prove tactics, namely 
to build a proof where each step corresponds to a computation step of the corresponding 
program tactics. Intuitively, the proof in Example 7.7 corresponds to checking that the 
object constructed by the composition of falletac, fandeltac and fallitac is of 
type Tut, i.e. that it is either a theorem or a failure. This is similar to what happens in 
tactic-based theorem provers, where program tactics construct theorems only by applying 
primitive tactics. Nevertheless, MT can prove statements which can be executed to assert 
theorems and which do not contain primitive tactics. For instance, 
Vx (Kzc(x) A Conj( x) II TucCfandel(x) ) (33) 
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where fatzdel corresponds to f andel, is a theorem of MT. Intuitively, (33) states that, 
under the proper conditions, i.e. when the argument is a conjunction, fandel can be 
used safely to construct a theorem. Similarly, the following are also theorems of MT. 
Vx (T(x) A Conj(x) > TCfandel(x))) (34) 
VxlVx2Vx3 (T(xI) A Vur(x2) A Par(x3) ANoFree(x3,nl) 
2 Tvhlli(xl ,x2,x3))) 
(35) 
VxlVx2Vx3 (T(xi > 
A Var(x2) A Term(x3) A ~ra~l(xl) 
A Conj($zlle( xi, x2, x3 ) ) (36) 
A Vur(x2) spar ~NoFree(x:,,fandel(falle(x1,x;?,x3))) 
> TCfalli(fandel(faZle(x~,x2,~3)),~2,~3))) 
The proof of (34) and (35) can be easily performed from tactics (9) and (10) by 
unfolding fandeltac and fallitac and factoring out the conditions of applicability of the 
rules. (36) can be proved in an analogous way. (34), (35) describe the object level 
rules AE) and V7’1. (36) describes the derived rule that applies VlE, AEl and VZ in the 
given order. Notice that (341, (35) and (36) describe explicitly the pr~onditions of 
applicability of the corresponding (derived) rule. In (36) we have the preconditions 
of VE (second line), the preconditions of A,!?! (third line) and those of VI (fourth 
line). The term falli($andelCfaZZe( xl, ~2, x3) ) , x2, x3) ) ) (fifth “line”) describes how 
rules get composed. (34), (35) and (36) say nothing of what happens when a rule 
which cannot be applied is applied. They do not take into account the code dealing with 
failures. In this sense, they are closer to the “usual” on paper metalevel descriptions of 
“non-mechanized” (derived) rules. 
Finally, since tactics are theorems of MT and correspond to program tactics, we can 
perform logical manipulation which corresponds to code ~ansfo~ation, thus optimizing 
program tactics. For instance, we can prove a wff which is logically equivalent to tactic 
(30) and which corresponds to a program tactic which avoids redundant tests. 
Example 7.8. We can prove in MT 
VX~VX~VX~ (Tac(xl) > 
faIlituc(Jandeltac~aIletuc( XI, x2, x3) > , x2, x3 ) = 
if -Fail( XI ) 
A Var(x2) A Term(x3) A Forall 
A C~~~~a~~e(~j, x2, x3)) 
A Par(x3) A NoF~e(xs,fundelCfalle(xl, x2, x3))) 
thenfalli(fandel~ulle(xl ,x2, x3)), x2, x3) 
else fail ) 
(37) 
The proof is performed by rewriting first faflitac~andeLtac~Zietac(x~ , x2, x3) ) , x2, x3) 
according to axioms (6)) (7) and the axiom about falletac in Appendix A, under the 
assumption Tac( XI ). We assume the wff in the if condition in wff (37) and its negation. 
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This allows us to eliminate conditional terms by applying if E and if E,. We can thus 
obtain 
fallitac(fandeltac~alletac(x~ , x7., x3) > , x2, x3) 
=failiCfandel($aZle(xl,x;!,x3)),~2,x3) 
depending on the if conditions in wff (37) (and Zhc( x1 ) ), and 
fallitacifandeltac~alletac( XI , x2, x3 > > , x2, x3 ) = fail 
depending on the negation of the if conditions in wff (37) (and Tac( xt )). We can 
thus apply if I discharging the assumptions and > I discharging Tac( xt ). While (30) 
corresponds to a program tactic which calls FAIL three times, and Var twice, (37) 
corresponds to a program tactic which calls these routines only once. 
Example 7.8 is very simple. The underlying intuition is that MT could be used 
(possibly with extensions) to optimize code in more significant ways (see discussion 
about Isabelle-like tactics in Section 10). 
8. Executing tactics 
Tactics can be given a procedural content and thus used to assert object level theorems. 
This can be done by interpreting them or by compiling (flattening) them into program 
tactics. 
8.1. Interpreting tactics 
Consider a generic tactic 
Y’x, . . .\fx, (Tac(xl) A.. .ATac(x,,) 3Tac(~~[xl,...,x,l)). 
By “tactic interpretation” we mean a process by which a tactic is fed into an interpreter 
which asserts; an object level theorem or fails. This process is performed in the following 
four steps. 
Step 1. Perform a sequence of forall eliminations, to obtain 
Tac(ci) A... A Tac(c,,) > TcIc(r,[ct,. . . ,c,]> 
where cl,. . . ,cnl, . . . , c, are constants naming objects of OT. This is the dual 
operation, in a procedural metalanguage, of typing the call to a program tactic 
on a set of arguments. 
Step 2. If any ci in cl,. . . , c,,, is either fail or the name of a sequent that has been 
proved in OT, then deduce 
as a theorem of MT, otherwise, stop. This is the dual operation of testing that 
swme of the arguments of the program tactic are of the right type, i.e. that 
they are either theorems or failure. 
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Step 3. Run simplify over the term T,[CI, . . . , c, I. If it returns a data structure 
implementing an object level sequent s, then deduce T(“s”) in MT. If it 
returns fail, stop. This is the dual operation of executing the body of the 
program tactic with instantiated arguments. 
Step 4. From T( “s”), assert s as a theorem of OT. This is the dual operation of 
asserting the result of the execution of a program tactic. 
Example 8.1. Let us consider tactic (30). In Step 1, we instantiate it by perform- 
ing three forall eliminations and by replacing XI. x2 and x3 with “s”, “x” and “a”, 
respectively. We obtain the following formula. 
7iic( “s”) > Tac(fhllitacCfhndeltc~u~~e~~c( “s”, “x”, “a”) ) , “x”, “u”) ) . 
In Step 2, we exploit the fact that t-or s: 
Tac~allitucCfandeltac(falletac( “s”, “x”, “a”) ) , “x”, “a”) ) . (38) 
The term in (38) is the tactic term of the sequent tree in Example 7.3. Step 3 
runs simplify over fullitucCfandeltuc~alletac( “s”, “x”, “a”) ) , “x”, “a”), that returns 
r +‘v’xA (x) . Then we have 
T(“r -vxA(x)“). 
Step 4 asserts r *‘v’xA(x) as a theorem of OT. 
Example 8.2. Let us consider now an execution that fails. We take the same tactic as 
before, but in Step 1 we instantiate it to obtain a ground wff that contains the tactic 
term of Example 7.4. We can perform Step 2 as in Example 8.1 to obtain: 
Tac(fallitac(jiindeltacCfalletac( “s”‘, “x”, “a”) ) , “x”, “a”) ) . 
Step 3 runs simplify over fallitacCfandeltac~alletac( “s”‘, “x”, “a”) ) , “x”, “a”), that 
returns fail (see Example 6.2). Then the process stops and Step 4 is not performed. 
Another possibility is to interpret metalevel statements that describe (derived) rules, 
e.g. wffs (34), (35) and (36). Their interpretation is similar to the interpretation of 
tactics. The first step is the same as Step 1. In the second step, wffs of the form T( “s”), 
where s is a theorem of OT, get factored out of the ground wff. The third step applies 
simplify to each of the atomic ground wffs whose main predicate symbol is not T. If 
it returns TRUE for all of them, then simplify is applied to the term argument of T. 
Otherwise, the process stops. The last step is the same as Step 4. 
Example 8.3. Consider wff (36). After the first two steps we have 
Var( “x”) A Term( “u”) A Forall( “s”) 
AConjCfalle( “s”, “x”, “a”) ) 
nVur( “x”) A Par( “a”) A NoFree( “x”,fandel(fulle( “s”, “x”, “u”) ) ) 
> T~alli(jundel(jalle( “s”, “x”, “u”) ) , ‘Ix”, “a”) ) 
(39) 
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The third :step applies simplify to the conjuncts. For each conjunct in (39), it re- 
turns TRUE:. simplify is then applied to fulli@zdelCfaZZe( “s”, “x”, “u”) ) , “A?, “a”). 
It returns .r +VxA(x) (see Example 6.1), which is then asserted as a theorem of 
OT. If xi gets instantiated with s’, then simplify returns FALSE when applied to 
ConjjCfalle( “s”, “xl’, “ ” a ) ) (Example 6.3). Therefore the process stops. 
8.2. Flattening tactics 
By flattening we mean a process which takes (certain) theorems of MT and generates 
program tactics in the HGKM code. As seen in Section 5, the code implementing a 
(primitive) program tactic is composed of three parts: the computation machinery, the 
top level machinery and the update machinery. Flattening must generate the computation 
and the top level machinery. The update machinery is the same for all inference rules. 
In MT it is possible to “split” a tactic into two wffs, each of them corresponding to the 
two parts of the code that must be generated. 
Vx, . . .Vx,? newtuc(xl,. . .,x,) = T,[x~,. . . ,xn], (40) 
vx, . . .‘dx, (Tac(x,) A * * .ATac(x,) 3tic(newtuc(xl,...,x,))). (41) 
(40) is the definition of a new function symbol newtac. We obtain (41) by rewriting 
r,[x1,..., x,] in (29) with (40). We can now generate the code of a new program 
tactic newtac corresponding to newtac. We flatten its computation machinery from 
(40). We flatten its top level machinery from (41). The flattening process exploits the 
attachments of MT applicative symbols to HGKM functions. Given the attachments, the 
flattening of (40) and (41) consists of a simple syntactical translation. Consider the 
following example. 
Example ft.4. From tactic (30) we can prove 
Vxi VxzVxs distuc( xl, x2, x3) 
=fullitac(&andeltuc@zfalletuc(xl , x2, x3) ), x2, x3), (42) 
VXlVx2VX3 (7izc(x,) > Tac(distac(xl, X2, X3))) (43) 
where distac corresponds to a program tactic which implements distributivity (of the 
universal quantifier over conjunctions). (42) gets flattened to 
(DEFL,AM distac (~1 ~2 ~3) 
(fallitac (fandeltac (falletac xl x2 x3)) x2 x3) > 
Notice that the universal statement is translated into a function definition. The universally 
quantified variables xi, x:! and x3 become the arguments xl, x2 and x3 of the function 
definition. The function symbol distuc gets translated into the HGKM symbol distac 
and distac is attached to distac. A simple syntactic translation is performed on the 
tactic term to obtain the body of the definition of distac. The top level machinery for 
distac is flattened from (43) to obtain 
(DEFL,AM ~1s 0 
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(tacfproof-update (distac (TAC) (TERM) (TERM))) > 
The name given to the top level function DIS is arbitrary. Flattening always builds the 
composition of the update routine tacfproof -update and of the functional part of 
the program tactic (in this case distac). The arguments of distac are constructed 
according to the hypotheses of the implication in (43). Since we have Tac(xt ), the 
first argument gets extracted by TAC. TERM is a routine for the extraction of terms of no 
specific type. 
We can also flatten logical manipulations of tactics and thus generate optimized code. 
Consider the following example. 
Example 8.5. In Section 7 we have manipulated wff (30) and obtained wff (37). 
From (37) and (42) we can prove 
vx,vx2vx3 (TaC(Xl) 3 
distuc( x, ) X2, x3) = 
if lFuil( xl ) 
A Vur( x2) A Pur(cq) A ForuU( XI ) 
A Conj(fulle( XI, x2, x3) ) 
A NoFree( ~3,fundelCfulle( XI, x2, x3) ) ) 
thenfuZZi(fundel(fuZle(x~, x2, x3)), x2, x3) 
else fail) 
(44) 
From (44) we can flatten the computation machinery of distac (and leave unchanged 
the top level machinery). The result is: 
(DEFLAM distac (xl x2 x3) 
(if (AND (NOT (FAIL ~1)) 
(VAR x2) (PAR x3) (FORALL xl) 
(CONJ (falle xl x2 x3)) 
(NOFFlEE (fandel (falle xl x2 x3)))) 
(falli (f andel (falle xl x2 x3) > x2 x3) 
fail)) 
The flattening process performs the same syntactic translations as in Example 8.4, namely 
it translates function and predicate symbols according to their attachments, it translates 
the conditional term if . . . then . . . else . . . into the conditional construct (if . . . > and 
the connectives A, 7 into AND, NOT, respectively. Notice that this program tactic is an 
optimized version of distac flattened in Example 8.4. When flattened, this definition 
will replace the previous definition. 
Once flattened, program tactics get executed in the standard way, i.e. the user can type 
the call to the program tactic with proper arguments, the arguments get type checked 
(e.g. by TAC), the body of the program tactic gets executed, and the state of the system 
gets affected by the update machinery. Executing the HGKM code obtained by flattening 
a tactic gives the same result as interpreting the tactic in MT. 
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Finally, notice that program tactics can be lifted into axioms of MT by a process 
which is the inverse of flattening. For instance, the user can handcode distac and DIS 
as in Example 8.4. This code can be lifted into wffs (42) and (43). Once MT has been 
lifted for the first time, lifting and flattening involves only the computation machinery 
and the top level machinery function definitions. 
9. Everything works - some technical results 
In this section we give some results which guarantee the correctness of the solutions 
proposed in Sections 6, 7 and 8. The proofs of theorems are in Appendix B. The results 
presented are technically not hard to prove. As described in Section 3, the hard work has 
been in stating them, i.e. in defining a metatheory and a mechanization of OT such that 
these results could be proved. They are needed to show that the proposed framework 
has all the desired properties. This section is mainly technical but not completely, as the 
results are discussed in relation to the goals of the paper. 
9.1. MT is consistent 
We define an interpretation M = (D,g) of ML, where D is the domain of interpre- 
tation and g is the interpretation function. The domain of interpretation 2) includes a 
set (called D,,) of objects of OT. The domain contains two special elements E and F. E 
intuitively denotes the value “undefined” and is used to handle partialness. We use F to 
interpret failure, i.e. the constant fail of MT. 
Definition 9.1. The interpretation M of ML is the pair (V,g). 2, = ‘D, U {E} U {F}. 
51),, is the set of terms, wffs and sequents of OT. E and F are distinct from any other 
element of D. g is defined as follows: 
( 1) g( “s”) = s, where s is any sequent of OT. 
(2) g( ‘Xv”) = w, where w is any wff of CYI’. 
(3) g( “t”) = t, where t is any term of O’I’. 
(4) g@il) = F. 
(5) g( Set) is the set of sequents of OT. 
(6) g( =) is the identity relation over D. 
(7) g(Par) is the set of individual parameters of OT. 
(8) g( Vur) is the set of individual variables of OT. 
(9) g( Corzj) is the set of sequents of OT whose formula is a conjunction. 
( IO) g( NoFree) is the relation over V2 such that (dl, d2) E g(NoFree) iff dl is 
an individual parameter of OT, d2 is a sequent r *A of OT and dl does not 
appear in r. 
( I I ) g(T) = TOT, where 7’0~ is the set of theorems of OT. 
( 12) g(fundel) is a function from D to ZJ such that, for any d E V 
ifdisr+AAB, 
otherwise. 
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( 13) g(falli) is a function from V3 to V such that, for any dl, d2, d3 E V 
{ 
r +b’xA;, if dl is f +A, d2 is a, d3 is x 
g(falli) (dt ,&,dg) = and a does not appear in r, 
E, otherwise. 
( 14) g(fundeltac) is a function from V to V such that, for any d E V 
i 
gCfand4 (d), if d E TOT and d E g( Conj), 
gCfandeltac) (d) = F’ 
if d E TOT U {F} 
and d $ g( Conj), 
E, otherwise. 
( 15) g(fullitac) is a function from V3 to V such that, for any dl , d2, d3 E V 
’ g(.Wi)(dl,d;!,ds), 
if dl E TOT, d2 E g( Var), d3 E g(Par) 
and (dn,dl) E g(NoFree), 
g(fallitac) (dl , d2, d3) = ( F, 
if dl E TOT U {F} and (d2 @ g( Vur) or 
ds $g(Par) or (ds,dt) $g(NoFree)), 
E, 
otherwise. 
Wffs and terms get interpreted according to the usual standard tarskian semantics. 
The semantics of conditional terms is as follows. The value of if A then tl else t2 is 
the value of tt if A is true, and the value of t2 otherwise. 
Theorem 9.2. M is a model of MT. 
Theorem 9.2 proves the consistency of MT. Moreover, since M is a model of MT, 
we have that 
If hT T(“s”) then br S 
for any sequent s of OT. We say that MT is correct with respect to UT. 
(45) 
It should now be clear in which sense the code of CYI’ has been developed to be 
a jinite presentation of the model of MT. Compare Definition 9.1 of M and the de- 
scription of the mechanization of OT given in Section 5. The HGKM functions which 
perform deduction in OT (e.g. f andel, f andeltac, CONJ) are (implemented to be) fi- 
nite presentations of the relations assigned by g (as defined above) to the corresponding 
application symbols (e.g. gCfandel), gCfandeltac), g( Conj) ) . We can thus use the simu- 
lation structure machinery to implement the mechanizable analogous of the interpretation 
in the model M. The commands ATTACH and MATTACH implement the (mechanizable 
analogue) of g. simplify tests the truth of wffs in M, i.e. it implements k,,,,. It is 
important to notice that the code of CYT is a presentation of only a partial model of MT. 
In particular Tut and T are left uninterpreted (see discussion in Section 6). 
F: Giunchixlia. I? Traver.w/Artijicial Intelligence 80 (1996) I97-241 223 
In Definition 9.1, we have introduced E to interpret function symbols (e.g. fundel and 
fulli) which correspond to HGKM partial functions (e.g. f andel and f alli). Partialness 
is a general characteristic of a large amount of the code of GETFOL (and of any 
running system). As it can be noticed from Definition 9.1, points (14) and (15), also 
f andeltac and f allitac are partial functions defined only over theorems or failures 
(corresponding to the set (TOT U {F}) & Do>. This is the case also for the tacticals 
implemented in GETFOL [ 251 (which are defined only over program tactics) and for all 
the code implementing destructors and constructors of logical syntactical categories, e.g. 
wffs and terms. Partialness allows us to achieve efficiency as the code does not have to 
test and decide for all the possible inputs. 
Extending the domain with E to handle partial functions is a well known standard 
technique (Isee, for instance, [ 12,421). One essential difference is that we have two 
distinct special elements, E and F. From a theoretical point of view, we could have 
constructed a model and a metatheory where E and F are collapsed into a unique 
element. The problem is that the mechanization of OT is not a finite presentation of this 
model. The distinction between E and F is important in order to define a correspondence 
between MT, its model M and the code implementing deduction in OT (as shown in 
Fig. 2). E is not denoted by any symbol in the language of MT and is not implemented 
by any data structure in the GETFOL code. It is used to capture in the model “defined 
on paper” the fact that some programs are partial. On the contrary, F is denoted by fail 
in MT and is implemented by the data structure fail in the GETFOL code. We say that 
fail is “a witness of observable failures”. 
9.2. Tlze use of SIMPLIFY is correct 
In Section 6 we use SIMPLIFY to assert axioms (13)-(25) and all their (ground) 
consequences. We show here that this use of the simulation structure machinery is 
sound. First notice that SIMPLIFY cannot be applied to all the (ground) terms or wffs 
of MT, since in MT we have symbols that are attached to partial functions. For instance, 
SIMPLIFY fandel( “ +A V B") would return a wrong value and SIMPLIFY Conj( “x”), 
where x is a variable of OT, would abort (see discussion in Section 6). In order to 
guarantee soundness, we apply SIMPLIFY only to a subset S, of terms of MT, called 
(the set of) simpl$ubfe terms, and a subset S, of wffs of MT, called (the set of) 
simpli$able wffs. Roughly speaking, these sets contain all and only the ground terms 
and atomic ground wffs which are well sorted. In the following, we write [ [t] ] M, to 
mean the element of D denoted by the term t of MT. 
Definition !).3 (SimpliJuble terms). 
( 1) Let 17 be a constant of MT. Then c E S,. 
(2) If t 15 & and [ [t]]M E g(Conj), then fundel(t) E S,. 
(3) If t19t2,t3 E St, ([[t3llM~[[tlllM) E g(NoFme) and [[t211M E g(Var), 
then fulli(t,,t2,tg) E S,. 
(4) If t ‘E S, and [ [t] ]M E TOT U {F}, then fundeltuc( t) E S,. 
(5) If tl,tz,tj Es, and [[tl]]M ETmU{F}, thenfullituc(tl,t2,t3) ES,. 
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Definition 9.4 (Simpl$able wffs) , 
( 1) If ti , t2 E S,, then tl = t:! E SW. 
(2) If t E S,, then Set(t) E S,. 
(3) If t E S, and [ [t]]M E g(Sec) U {F}, then Fail(t) E S,. 
(4) If t E S, and [ [t]]M E g(Sec), then Conj(t) E S,. 
(5) If t E A’,, then Par(t) E SW,. 
(6) If t E S,, then Var( t) E S,. 
(7) If tl, t2 E S,, tl E g(Par> and t2 E g(Sec), then Nofree(tl,tz) E S,. 
Notice that even if t E S,, T(t) 6 S,,. and Tac( t) 6 SW also in the case where t is of 
the correct type, i.e. it denotes theorems or theorems and failures, respectively. This is 
only because T and Tat are not attached to anything. 
The soundness of the operation performed by SIMPLIFY is not obvious as in general 
the set of provable formulas is a subset of the set of true formulas. The following 
theorem guarantees that this is not the case. 
Theorem 9.5 (Correctness of simplify). Let w E SW. Then kM w j IMT w and 
kW w*t-MTlW. 
Notice that, from a purely theoretical point of view, with minor modifications of the 
ground axioms, Theorem 9.5 can be stated for all the ground atomic wffs that do not 
contain T and Tat, and not only limited to simplifiable wffs. For instance, we could 
extend the set of ground axioms to include +&rj(“x”> and thus have FM Conj(“x”) 
and k~r -Conj( “A?). But this extension would not be in the spirit of a metatheory of 
a mechanized object theory, in the sense that it would not take into account the fact 
that the code is partial, e.g. the fact that CONJ cannot be run successfully on a data 
structure recording a variable. Definitions 9.3 and 9.4 capture exactly those expressions 
that can be evaluated by the simulation structure machinery. Theorem 9.5 captures the 
actual relation between provability in MT and truth in the mechanizable analogue of its 
model. 
9.3. MT is correct and complete with respect to provability in OT 
We prove that tactic terms have the right behaviour. 
Theorem 9.6 (MT correct and complete w.r.t. OT). Let I7 be a sequent tree of s. Let 
r,, be the tactic term of Il. Then 
( I ) ~~ 7, = “S” - (a) II is a proof of s - (b) hT ~-CT,). 
(2) hr 7, =fail - (a) n is not a proof - (b) k&,T ~T(T,,). 
Part ( 1) of Theorem 9.6 states that a tactic term corresponds to a successful proof iff 
it can be proved equal to the name of a sequent (part ( la) ) which denotes a theorem 
of OT (part ( lb) ) . Part (2) states that a tactic term corresponds to a sequent tree 
which is not a proof iff it can be proved equal to failure (part (2a)) iff it does not 
denote a theorem of OT (part (2b)). Notice that the fact that a program tactic fails to 
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prove a sequent does not imply that the sequent is not provable. Analogously, part (2b) 
of Theorem 9.6 states that the tactic term does not denote a theorem (i.e. .T(t7)), 
but does not state the much stronger fact that s is not a theorem (i.e. --J’(“Y’) ). This 
result is therefore very different from the fact that --17‘(“s”) is provable in MT iff s is 
not provable in OT. Theorem 9.6 makes a statement about a single sequent ree Z7 and 
not about the provability of 3, which would involve considering all sequent rees of s. 
However, in part ( 1) of Theorem 9.6, the two notions collapse and from T(v-~) it is 
possible to prove T(“s”). Indeed, as a corollary of Theorem 9.6, we have that if s is 
provable in OT then T(“s”) is provable in MT. We have therefore that reflection down 
and reflection up, namely [ 22,231 
Rdown hT Tt“s”) hYrs 
bT s 
3 Rup EMT T( “s”) (46) 
are correct inference rules between theories in the multitheory system MT-OT, and that 
axioms ( II), ( 12) need not be explicitly and a priori stated. They can in fact be proved 
and asserted when needed with an application of RUp. 
9.4. All tactics are theorems of MT 
We prove that all tactics are theorems of MT. 
Theorem 9.7. Any tactic is provable in MI: 
The fact that all tactics are provable in MT is exactly what we should have expected. 
In fact, any tactic corresponds to a program tactic which can be defined in the system 
code. To say that any tactic can be derived in the metatheo~ is equivalent o saying 
that any strategy implementing any finite composition of inference steps can be written 
in HGKM. 
In Section 7 we have proved theorems (34)) (35) and (36). They represent, without 
taking into account failure, (derived) object level inference rules. We show now that 
theorems of this kind can be proved in general. First we need some technical definitions. 
The sequent ree term t, and the preconditions P, of a sequent ree 17 are defined 
inductively over the structure of sequent rees. In the base case, a sequent ree is a 
single sequent s. If the sequent is a proof, i.e. it is either an axiom or an assumption, 
then its sequent ree term is “s” and its pr~onditions are T(“s”). If it is not a proof, 
i.e. it is neither an axiom nor an assumption, then its sequent ree term is fail and its 
preconditions are T(fai1). In the step case, if t,, and Pn, are the sequent ree term 
and the preconditions of nt, and L7 is built from ZIt by applying AEI (VI a x) to 
the end sequent of ZIt, then fan&&t,,) yhlli( tn,, “x”, “a”)) and P,, A Conj(t,, ) 
(P,, A Vur(“x”) A Par(“u”) A ~o~ree~“u”, t,, )) are the sequent ree term and the 
preconditions of ZI, respectively. For instance, if a sequent tree is built by applying first 
VE x a to an axiom s, and then AEl and Vf x a are applied in the sequent ree in the 
given order, then the corresponding sequent ree term is 
fa6li~andel~lle( “s”, ‘P’, “a”) ) , “x”, “u”) 
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and the co~esponding preconditions are 
T( “s”) 
A Vur( “x”) A Term (“a”) A Forall ( “s”) 
~Conj(fdfe( “s”, “x”, “a”) ) 
r\Var( “2’) A Pat-( “u”) A ~oFree( “x”, f~~~e~~~le( “s”, “x”, “u”) ) ) . 
For each OT sequent tree we have a wff of the form P?,[cl, . . . , c,] 3 
T(f,[Cl,. *. , c,?]), where cl,. . . ,c, are the individual constants appearing in the se- 
quent tree term and in the preconditions. Let xl,. . . , xn be individual variables of MT. 
We write as 7>n[xt,...,x,,] and t,[nt , . . . ,x,1 the wff and the term obtained by re- 
placing the constants et, . . . , c, in %‘*[ci , . . . , c,,] and t,[ct , . . . , c,] with the variables 
XI,...,X,, respectively. We have that: 
Theorem 9.8. Any w# of the form 
vix, . ..\Jx,, (PTriIXl,...,&l 3T(t,lxi,..*,x,l)~ 
is provable in MT 
(47) 
9.5. Tactic execution is correct 
Under the hypothesis that the underlying implementation is correct, tactic interpreta- 
tion (described in Section 8.1) is correct, as it is the sequence of four steps, each of 
which is provably correct. Step 1 is trivially correct. The correctness of Step 2 is a con- 
sequence of Theorem 9.6. In fact, if ci isfail, then k~r ~c~~i~), while if ci is “s” with 
t-or s, then we have ~-MT ( “s”) and therefore kkrr 7bc( “s”). The correctness of Step 
3 is a consequence of Theorems 9.5 and 9.6. We compute simplif y( r,, [ cl,. . . , c, I), 
where T,[cI,.... c,] is a simplifiable term. If simplify(r,[ ct , . . . , c,] ) = s, then 
we have that the simplifiable wff r,[ct , . . . , cn] = r‘~” is true in M and, therefore, 
IMT T,[Cl,. . . , c,] = “s" (Theorem 9.5). From Theorem 9.6 part ( 1) we have that 
hr T(“s”). If simplify(ra[ct,. ..,c,,l> = fail, then we have that the simplifiable 
wff r,[cr,... , c,,] =fuil is true in M and, therefore, hr r,,[ct , . . . , c,] = fail (Theo- 
rem 9.5). From Theorem 9.6 part (2) we have that r,, does not correspond to a proof. 
Therefore the interpretation process stops correctly. Finally, property (45) (and also 
Theorem 9.6) guarantees that Step 4 is correct. The correctness of the interpretation of 
wffs of the form (47) can be shown exactly in the same way. 
The correctness of flattening can be argued very much in the same way, the main 
difference being that the reflecting up from OT and the assertion of a theorem in OT 
must be considered in terms of function calls to the HGKM functions fproof-update 
and TAC (see Section 5). 
9.6. A remark 
The theoretical results presented above are all is needed to show that our approach is 
correct under the hypothesis that the GETFOlL code does what it is supposed to do. In fact 
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we know that MT, as lifted from the code, is consistent, that SIMPLIFY is used correctly, 
that MT is correct and complete with respect to proofs (and non-proofs) in OT, that 
it can express and prove all tactics, and that tactics can be executed correctly. We still 
do not have a guarantee that an incorrect implementation will not derive non-theorems 
and derive all theorems, not even in principle. In fact we have given all the results with 
respect to a set-theoretic characterization of what the GETFOL code does, i.e. we have 
claimed that the code is a finite presentation of the model defined in Section 9.1. 
To lift this hypothesis requires axiomatizing the underlying HGKM interpreter. This 
work is being done as part of the subproject reimplementing GETFOL (see Section 3). 
Some preliminary results can be found in [ 1,18,20], a full account is the topic of a 
forthcoming paper. Briefly put, these results start from an axiomatization of the HGKM 
interpreter, based on the work described in [49,56]. Then a representability property 
is shown to hold between the HGKM implementation of OT and MT. This property is 
similar to the notions of numeralwise representability and numeralwise expressibility, as 
described for example in [ 391. Some complications arise, for instance because we must 
take into account the fact that GETFOL has state. These results give us the correctness of 
the GETFOL implementation modulo the correctness of the HGKM interpreter, i.e. modulo 
the fact that HGKM does what it is supposed to do. 
10. Current and future work 
As hinted in Section 3, we have an implementation of everything described in this 
paper. Within GETFOL, we have mechanized OT, MT and the procedures to synthesize 
and execute tactics. However MT, as described so far, can express a very limited class 
of tactics, only the tactics that correspond to finite compositions of proof steps. A lot of 
work is currently under way to overcome the current limitations of MT. 
A first step is to extend MT to be expressive enough to represent the program tactics 
and tacticals used in most tactic-based interactive theorem provers (e.g. [ 14,32,43,44] ) . 
[ 251 describes how MT can be extended to axiomatize the most interesting tacticals, 
i.e. then, orelse, try, progress and repeat. Consider for instance the tactical repeat. Its 
axiomatization is as follows. 
‘JxVt (7&(x) ALTac(t) 3 
appi!y( repeat( t), x) = 
if (apply( t, x) =fail> 
then x 
else apply( repeM t> ,apply( t, x> > 1 
where x and t are individual variables and LTac is a unary predicate holding of terms 
called logic tactics. Logic tactics include a constant for each primitive tactic, e.g. 
“jhdeltuc” and “@litad’, and terms constructed by composing logic tactics through 
tacticals, e.g. repeat( orefse( “jandeltac”, ‘fallituc”) > . The function symbol apply is used 
to express tactic application. For instance we have that 
Vx (?%c( x) > upply( “jbzdeltuc”, x) =fandeltac( x) ) 
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is provable in the extended MT. The tactical repeat is the standard tactical used to 
write strategies, based on iteration and on the recursive application of tactics, which 
do not necessarily correspond to a finite composition of proof steps. This form of 
recursion can be safely represented. A problem is that, in general, repeat is not powerful 
enough and that, on the other hand, introducing rules which allow for the construction 
of recursive logic tactics may not preserve consistency. At the moment we are studying 
some more general sufficient conditions for a characterization of recursive (possibly 
“not terminating”) logic tactics which preserve consistency. We are also studying how 
to synthesize tactics containing tacticals, extending “naturally” the results presented in 
Section 9.3. 
A second step is to provide MT with induction principles. Induction principles are 
necessary in order to synthesize or prove the correctness of certain derived inference 
rules (see for instance [ 8,371). Some preliminary experiments of theorem proving in 
such extensions of MT have been performed. [ 11 describes a proof of the theorem about 
formulas containing only equivalences stated in [ 541 (the same theorem is also stated 
and proved in [ 31). A problem which we are now starting to investigate is how and to 
what extent such induction principles can be lifted from the code. [20] discusses some 
ideas about how this can be done for wffs and proofs. 
A third step is to extend MT to prove metarules similar to those described in [ 441. 
[52] describes some preliminary work in this direction, limited to the propositional 
case. These rules are characterized by the fact that they use only wff constructors. Thus, 
for instance, it is possible to express in our notation the statement “if the formula A A B 
is a theorem, then A is a theorem” as 
where xl, x2 range over wffs, Th is a unary predicate such that ,(“A”) holds iff 
T( “ + A”) holds, and mkand is a wff constructor which takes two wffs and builds their 
conjunction. Notice that this is different from what we can prove in MT, i.e. 
V’x (T(x) A Cunj(x) > TCfandef(x))), 
where x ranges over sequents and fandel is, intuitively speaking, a proof constructor. This 
extension would allow us to extract from any given tactic which explicitly represents all 
the proofs steps, a corresponding new tactic of only one proof step (and which does all 
the manipulation at the formula level). This latter tactic corresponds to a program tactic 
that is in general much faster to execute. An interesting open problem here is whether 
it is possible to do this by using (an extended version of) the simulation structure 
machinery, and therefore, without explicitly adding axioms to MT. 
Finally we have just started to investigate how to use MT to synthesize interesting 
tactics effectively. We have started to develop a set of rewriting functions similar to 
those implemented in Cambridge LCF and described in [ 451. Our goal is to perform in 
MT a similar kind of reasoning to that performed in proof planning [IO]. 
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11. Related work 
Compared to the previous research in metalevel theorem proving, the work described 
in this paper is limited in at least three respects. First, it does not allow the use of 
expressive control structures and tacticals, as it is the case, for instance in [ 16,30,37] 
(but this has been fixed in [25] ). Second, it does not allow induction, which is used 
for instance in the metatheories described in [8,37]. Third, so far the system has been 
used only to synthesize simple tactics. As described in Section 10, these topics are 
currently being investigated. We actually hope that the techniques elaborated in the past 
will largely apply to MT and its extensions (the extent to which this is true is still to be 
found out). This investigation promises to be a very interesting project as trying to keep 
the connection between the metatheory and the code may lead us to see the previous 
work (and in particular ours) in a new perspective. Finally, MT is first order, unlike in 
the work described in [ 16,37,40,44]. This provides some advantages, see for instance 
the discussions in [ 12,291, however it might prevent us from performing interesting 
forms of reasoning. 
However, these issues, though very important, are somehow orthogonal to the main 
message of this paper, which is about describing a metatheory of a mechanized object 
theory, i.e. a metatheory which can be put in correspondence with the code implementing 
the object lheory, and about how this can be exploited to perform lifting, flattening and 
tactic interpretation. None of the metatheories developed in the past (besides, of course, 
the work on FOL, see Section 3) has features similar to MT. This is the case, for 
instance for LCF [ 321, NuPRL [ 14,37,40], Isabelle [ 441, HOL [ 3 11, 0BJ3 [ 29,301, 
for the provers based on logic programming (see e.g. [5,6,16,35,36]) and for the 
logical frarneworks [ 2,3,33]. This has some consequences. None of these systems can 
reason about the underlying code. Even if LCF, HOL, NuPRL and Isabelle provide a 
metalanguage for writing program tactics, there seems to be no straightforward way 
to translate them into metalevel logical statements or vice versa. In the area of logic 
programming, even if they can control the Prolog search strategy, the metainterpreters 
cannot modify it. That is, the user can write a metainterpreter for any desired search 
strategy, however the metainterpreter will be executed by using the Prolog built-in search 
strategy. 
The fact that MT is a metatheory of a mechanized object theory gives it some features 
which mak.e it somewhat unusual. Thus, for instance, some of the features of MT that 
cannot be found in any of the work described in the past are the following: the syntax 
is not explicitly axiomatized and the needed facts are extracted from the code using the 
simulation structure machinery, in the axiomatization of the syntax only ground facts 
are considered; the notion of failure is explicitly axiomatized, using fail and FAIL, and 
kept distinct form the notion of partialness; MT makes a distinction between inference 
rules and primitive tactics and has a notion of tactic. Some more usual features, but 
still not standard are the following: inference rules are functions and not predicates, 
as it happens for instance in [53]; inference rules do not take theories and signatures 
as arguments, as it happens for instance in [53] (this in GETFOL is solved using the 
multicontext machinery [ 171); even if MT can reason about proofs this notion is not 
explicitly axiomatized, as it happens for instance in [ 3,531. 
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In our approach the code implementing inference rules and program tactics is really 
like axioms, i.e. modulo lifting, this code can be added to MT and used to derive new 
facts. In this perspective our work is similar in spirit to Boyer and Moore’s work on 
metafunctions [ 81 (modulo the limitations described at the beginning of this section). 
A difference is that in the work described in this paper (also considering the extensions 
allowing tacticals) we have mainly considered how to compose simple tactics into more 
complex tactics. In [8] the emphasis is instead on proving the correctness of derived 
inference rules (not expressed as composition of simpler inference rules) using induction 
principles. 
Our long term goal, far from being achieved, is to develop CETFOL into a system 
whose code is provably correct, and which provides facilities for provably correct system 
development. This goal is similar to that underlying the development of Acl2 [9], a 
reimplementation of a portion of the Boyer and Moore theorem prover [ 71, using the 
same logic for which Acl2 is a theorem prover. One main difference is that in Acl2 the 
logic language and the implementation language are the same. This is possible since Acl2 
is written applicatively. On the other hand, GETFOL has a lot of state, e.g. the language 
of a theory, the axioms, the theorems and the proofs constructed so far, but also global 
variables used to optimize the implementation of decision procedures, counters used for 
the automatic generation of different names for skolem functions, and so on. This gives 
us some advantages, like that of being able of showing the proof constructed so far; 
however it complicates the relation between the implementation and the logical language 
(they are essentially identical only for what concerns the computation machinery, which 
is in fact functional, see Sections 5 and 6). Some preliminary discussions about how 
to hide state during the lifting are done in [ 18,201. Some hints are also in Section 6, 
in the specific case of lifting the update and top level machinery implementing GETFOL 
proofs. 
We share the goal of self-reflection with a lot of work in the programming language 
community (see for instance [ 38,57]), one of the first contributions in this area be- 
ing the work on 3-lisp [47]. The substantial difference is that in our approach the 
introspection is performed by deduction instead of by computation. 
Finally, as a minor remark, a further difference with a lot of the related work, with the 
noticeable exceptions of [ 10,36,55], is that MT is distinct from CYT. (Some motivations 
and advantages for this choice are given in [22] .) In Gijdel [ 361, in particular, the 
naming relation has some commonalities with that employed in MT. Roughly speaking, 
both MT and GGdel allow for structural descriptive names. One difference is that GETFOL 
has no hardwired naming machinery and that the objects of OT can be given arbitrary 
names. 
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Appendix .A. The metatheoxy MT 
MT is a. triple MT = (ML:, Mdx, MR) where ML, Mdx and MR are the 
language, the set of axioms and the set of inference rules of MT, respectively. 
A.I. The language ML 
Individual (constants 
The quotation mark names of the objects of OT plus fail. 
Function symbols 
AI : fandi,fanditac of arity 2, 
AEI : fandel,fandeltac of arity 1, 
AE, : fander, fandertac of arity 1, 
3 I : jimpi,jimpitac of arity 2, 
> E : fimpe,Jimpetac of arity 2, 
VI : falli, fallitac of arity 3, 
VE : falle,falletac of arity 3, 
I, : false,falsetac of arity 2. 
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Predicate symbols 
Par, Vat-, Term, Set, Wff of arity 1, 
Conj, Imp, Forall, False of arity 1, 
T, Fail, Tat of arity 1, 
NoFree, Hp of arity 2, 
= of arity 2. 
Sentential constants 
I, T. 
A.2. The axioms MAX 
Basic axioms 
Vx l(Sec(x) A Fail(x)) 
Vx (T(x) > Set(x)) 
Vx (Fail(x) c-1 x =fail) 
Inference rule axioms 
VXIVXZ -, fandi(xI ,x2) = fail, 
Vx 7 fandel(x) = fail, 
Vx 7 fander( x) = fail, 
Vx1 VXZ 1 jimpi(xl , x2) = fail, 
Vxl Vx2 1 $mpe( x1, x2) = fail, 
Vxl Vx2Vx3 1 falli( x1, x2, x3 ) = fail, 
VxjVx2Vx3 7 falle(xl ,x2, x3) = fail, 
Vx, VXZ 1 false( xl, x2) = fail. 
Computation machinery axioms 
Vx1Vx2 (Tac(xl) A Tac(x2) > 
fanditac(xl,xz) = if --Fail(xl) A TFail(x2) 
then fandi( x1, x2) else fail) 
Vx (Tat(x) > 
fandeltac( x) = if lFail( x) A Conj( x) then fandel( x) else fat’/) 
Vx (Tat(x) > 
fandertac(x) = if yFail(x) A Conj(x) then fander(x) else fail) 
Vx1Vx2 (Tac(x;?) > 
$mpitac( xl, x2) = if lFail( x2) A W#( XI ) then $mpi( xl, x2) else fail) 
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\dx,Yx2 (TaC(Xl) A 7q.Q) > 
Jiwetac( XI, x2 ) = if dzil( XI ) A +iuil( x2) A Zmp( x2) A Hp( x1, x2) 
then jmpe( XI, x2) else fail) 
233 
vx,vx2vx3 (Tac(x1) 3 
fullituc( x , 1 x2, x3 > 
=if -dGil(x~) A Vur(x2) APur(x3) ANoFree(x3,x~) 
then fulli( x I , x2, x3 > else fail) 
vxIVx;vx3 (xzC(Xl> II 
fulletuc( xl, x2, x3 ) 
= if lf%il( xl ) A Vur( x2) A Term(x3) A Fiindl( x1 ) 
then fulle( xl, x2, x3 > else fail) 
VXIV’X:, (Tac(x,) 3 
fuketuc(x,,x2) = if 4%il(xl) A Wfl(x~2.) AFalse 
then fulse( x I, x2) else fail) 
Update machinery axioms 
Vx (7&(x) t+ T(x) V Fail(x)). 
Top level machinery axioms 
Vxlb’xa (Tuc(xl) A Tuc(x2) 3 TucC&ndituc(x,,x2))) 
Vx ( Ttrc( x) 2 TucCfundeltuc( x) ) ) 
Vx (k(x) > TucCfundertuc( x) ) ) 
VxlV’x:, (Tuc(x2) > Tuc@mpituc(xl, x2) )) 
VxlVx:, (Tuc(xl) A Tuc(x2) 3 Tuc(fimpetuc(xl,x2))) 
VXIVQVX~ (Tuc(xl) > Tuccfallituc(x1,x2,x3))) 
VXIQX~VX~ (TIC > TucCfafletuc(xl,xz,x3))) 
VxlVx2 (TUC(XI) > Tuc(fulsetuc(xI,xq))) 
Let a, x, t, and w be any individual parameter, individual variable, term and wff of 
OT. Let A, B and C be wffs of OT. Let r and A be finite sets of formulas of OT. Let 
c, cl, c2 be constants of OT. Let 5 be any object of CT. 
Ground axioms about T 
T(“A ,+A”) 
T(” -+A”), if +AEdx 
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Ground axioms about inference rules 
fandi( “P + A”, “A -_) B) = “P, A -+ A A B” 
fandel(“P + A A B”) = “r w A” 
fander(“P + A A B”) = “r --_) B” 
jimpi( “A”, “P +B”) = “P - {A} --_) A > B” 
fimpe(“T + A”, ” A +A > B) = “r,A -+B” 
falli( “P -+ A”, “x”, “a”) = “P +VxAz”, where a does not occur in r 
.falle( “P +VxA”, “x”, Y’) = “r + A:” 
fimpi( ,‘r +I”, “A”) = “r - {A > I} +A” 
Ground axioms about syntax 
Par( “a”) 
lPar( c) , if c is fail or “f’ and 5 is not an individual parameter of OT 
Var( “2’) 
-Var(c), if c is fail or “r’ and 6 is not an individual variable of OT 
Term (“t”) 
TTerm(c), if c is fail or “5” and 5 is not a term of OT 
Wsf( “W”) 
-Wsf(c) 3 if c is fail or “5” and ,$ is not a wff of OT 
7 Cl =c2, if ct and c2 are distinct individual constants 
Conj( “r + A A B”) 
Xonj( “P + A”), if A is not a conjunction 
Imp( “P ---) A 3 B”) 
+np(“r 4A”), if A is not an implication 
Hp(“P +A “, “A + A > B”) 
lHp( “r 4 A”, “A +C”) , if C is not of the form A > B 
NoFree(“a”, “P + A”), if a does not appear in r 
TNoFree( “a”, “P + A”), if a appears in r 
Forall(“T +VxA”) 
TForall(“T + A”), if A is not universally quantified 
False ( “P ---) _L”) 
+alse(“r +A”), if A is not I 
Sec( “r -+ A”) 
-6ec ( “5”) , if 6 is not a sequent of OT 
Appendix B. Proofs 
B.I. Proof of Theorem 9.2 
We show that for any wff Q in ML, b1~1~ a implies k=M (Y. Axiom (1) is true 
since g(Sec) tl g( Fail) = 0. Axiom (2) is true since g(T) C g(Sec). Axiom (3) 
defines the predicate Fail. Axioms (4) and (5) are true since g(fande1) (d) $ {F} and 
g(falli)(dl.d2,&) 6 {F} f or any d, dl, d2,ds E 23. Consider axiom (6). Let XI be 
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assigned to d E g( Tut). If d E g( Conj), then the conditional term is interpreted into 
gCfundel) (d). If d @ g( Conj), then it is interpreted into F. Then axiom (6) is true. The 
proof for axiom (7) is analogous. Axiom (8) defines the predicate Tut. Axiom (9) is 
true since, if x is assigned to d E g( Tut), then g(fandeltuc) (d) E g( Tut), The proof for 
axiom ( 10) is analogous. Axioms ( 1 l), ( 12) are true since OT axioms and assumptions 
belong to g(T). Axioms (13), (14) are true since g@zndel)(r4A~B) = Z”4A 
and, if a does not appear in r, g(fulli) (r 4A, x, a) = r +VxAz. Axioms (15)-( 25) 
are trivially true. 
B.2. Proof of Theorem 9.5 
We first prove the following lemma. 
Lemma B-1. Let t E S,. Let c E S, be u constant of MT Zf kM t = c, then ~MT t = c. 
Proof. By induction over the structure of t. 
Base. Obvious since we have c = c. 
Step. We have one case for each form of simplifiable term (Definition 9.3). Let 
t, tl, t2, tg E St. 
( 1) fundel( t) . t denotes a sequent of the form r -+ AA B, since t E S,. Then k,,,, t = 
“r 4AA B”. From the induction hypotheses we have that tMr t = “r 4AA B”. 
+A,, fundel( t) = c implies that c denotes r 4 A. fundel( “r 4A A B”) = 
“r -+A” is axiom ( 13). 
(2) faUi( tl , t2, t3). We have that tt denotes a sequent of the form r +A, t2 denotes 
an Individual variable x and t3 denotes an individual parameter a which does not 
appear free in r. From the induction hypotheses we have that k&tr t I = “r 4 A”, 
b7. t2 = “x” and br t3 = “a”. c denotes r 4VxA$ falli( k‘r 4 A”, “x”, “a”) = 
“r +VxAz” is axiom ( 14). 
(3) fundeltuc( t). The proof is similar to the proof for fundel( t). If t denotes a 
sequent that is a conjunction, then we use axioms (6) and (20). If t denotes a 
sequent that is not a conjunction, then we use axioms (6) and (21). If t denotes 
F, ihen we use axioms (6) and (3). 
(4) falr’ituc( ?I, t2, tg) . The proof is similar to the proof for fulli( tl , t2, tg ) . Cl 
Now we prove the following theorem. 
Theorem B.2. Let w E S,. Then k=M w 3 bT W. 
Proof. We have one case for each form of simplifiable wff (Definition 9.4). 
( I) ti := t2. By induction over t2. The base case is Lemma B.l. The step cases are 
analogous to the step cases of the proof of Lemma B.l. 
(2) See(t). t denotes a sequent S. From Lemma B.l we have tMr t = “s”. Sec( “3”) 
is axiom (24). 
(3) Fa,il(t). t denotes F. From Lemma B.l we have br t = fail. From definition 
(3 ) we have )Mr Failcfail). 
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(4) Conj( t). t denotes a sequent s whose formula is a conjunction. From Lemma 
B. 1 we have t-t,,rr t = “s”. Conj(“s”) is axiom (20). 
(5) Par(t). t denotes an individual parameter a. From Lemma B.1 we have br t = 
“a”. Par( “a”) is axiom ( 15). 
(6) Var( t). t denotes an individual variable x. From Lemma B.l we have hr t = “x”. 
Var( “2’) is axiom ( 17). 
(7) Nofree( tl , t2). t2 denotes a sequent r +A and tl denotes an individual param- 
eter a that does not appear in r. From Lemma B.l we have hr t2 = “r +A” 
and br tl = “a”. Nofree(“a”, “r +A”) is axiom (22). 0 
We prove the following lemma. 
Lemma B.3. Let t E S,. Let c E S, be a constant of MT. If p,,,, t = c, then ~MT 1 t = c. 
Proof. We have one case for each form of simplifiable term (Definition 9.3). If FM 
cl = ~2, then cl and c2 are distinct constants. 1 ct = cp is axiom (19). Consider 
now simplifiable terms of the form fandef( t). From the fact that t E S, we have that 
fade/(t) denotes a sequent s and, therefore, /-MT fandel( t) = “s” (Theorem B.2). 
FM fade/(t) = c implies that FM “s” = c and, therefore, br 1“s” = c (axiom 
( 19) ) . The proof for the other cases is similar. 0 
Finally, we prove the following theorem. 
Theorem B.4. Let w E S,. Then pM w =+ hT -w. 
Proof. We have one case for each form of simplifiable wff (Definition 9.4). 
(1) tt = t2. By induction over t2. The base case is Lemma B.3. The step cases are 
analogous to the step cases of the proof of Lemma B.3. 
(2) Sec( t). Either t denotes any object 5 of OT that is not a sequent or it denotes F. 
In the former case, from Theorem B.2 we have hr t = “5”. Gec(“e’) is axiom 
(25). In the latter case, from Theorem B.2 we have hr t = fail. From axiom 
( 1) we have l’&tr Tsec( t). 
(3) Fail(t). t denotes a sequent s. From Theorem B.2 we have kt,,rr t = “s”. From 
axiom ( 1) we have l-&r-r +ail( t). 
(4) Canj( t) . t denotes a sequent s whose formula is not a conjunction. From Theorem 
B.2 we have br t = “s”. Xonj(“s”) is axiom (21). 
(5) Par(t). t denotes either F or an object 5 of OT which is not an individual 
parameter. From Theorem B.2 we have either kt$r t = fail or hr t = “5”. From 
axiom ( 16) we have either hr TParCfail) or br lPar( “&“). 
(6) Var( t). Proof analogous to the proof for Par(t). 
(7) Nofree( tl , t2). t2 denotes a sequent r +A and tl denotes an individual param- 
eter a that appears in r. From Theorem B.2 we have br t2 = “r +A” and 
hr tl = “a”. TNofree( “a”, “ T--*A”) is axiom (23). q 
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B.3. Proof of Theorem 9.6 
Theorem B.5 proves parts ( la) + and ( 1 b) +, Theorem B.6 proves part (2a) + and 
(2b) +. In the proofs, we call II the sequent tree of s built by applying an inference 
rule to the sequent ~1, end sequent of nl. We call TV, and r, the tactic terms of 171 and 
l7, respectively. The proofs are by induction over the structure of sequent trees. We give 
only the proof for (VI) as conceptually identical to that for ( A,?$). ( la) +, ( lb) x=, 
(2a) =+ and (2b) + are trivial corollaries of Theorems B.5 and B.6 and Theorem 9.2 
(proofs by (contradiction). 
Theorem B.5. Let II be a sequent tree of s. Let r, be the tactic term of Il. If II is a 
proof of s, ,!hen kMT rT = “so and k-MT ( “s”). 
Proof. 
Base. If .17 is s, then it must be either an axiom or an assumption. Then r,, is “s” 
and T(“s”) is either axiom (11) or axiom (12). 
Step. r, ik fallitac( T,, , “x”, “a”). From the induction hypotheses ~MT 7,, = “~1” and 
~MT T(“sl”). From hT T(“sl”) we have hT Tac(“sl”). From axiom (7) we have 
hT faktac( 7,, , “x”, “a”) 
= if +ail( “sl “) A Var( “2’) A Par( “a”) A NoFree( “a”, “sl “) 
then falli( “si “, “x”, “a”) 
else fail 
(B.1) 
From axiom ( 1) and ground axioms we have hT r, = fak( “sl”, “x”, “a”) and hT 
7 - “s”. From axiom ( 10) we obtain kMT TaccfalZitac(“s~“, “x”, “a”) ) and therefore 
t&-&(“S”). From axiom (1) we have hT T(“s”). 0 
Theorem B’.6. Let 17 be a sequent tree of s. Let r, be the tactic term of IZ. If I7 is 
not a proof, then k’MT r,, = fail and kMT -T( 7,). 
Proof. 
Base. If L7 is s, then it is neither an axiom nor an assumption. Then 7, is fail. 
Step. r, is fallitac(r,,, , “x”, “a”). We have two cases. 
( 1) 171 is a proof. From Theorem B.5 we have that hT T,, = “~1” and hT T( “,I”), 
which implies hT Tac( “s,“). From axiom (7) we have (B.l). From axiom 
(23 1) we have kMT r, = fail and therefore kMT 7T( 7,) (axioms ( 1) , (2) ) . 
(2) 171 is not a proof. From the induction hypotheses we have that hT 7,, = fail. 
Therefore bT Tac( T,,, ) . From axiom (7) we have 
hT 7v = if +ailcfai/) A Var( “x”) A Par( “a”) A NoFree( “a”,fail) 
then falli~ail, “x”, “a”) 
else fail 
Since hT Failcfail), we prove r, = fail and therefore hT 7T( 7,). 0 
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B.4. Proof of Theorem 9.7 
Proof by induction over the structure of Q-,(X, , . . . ,x,). 
Base. In the base case a tactic term is either “s” or fail. The corresponding tactic is 
V’x (Tut(x) > Tut(x)). 
Step. We consider only the case of (V’I) as the case of (A&) is very similar. Induction 
hypotheses are 
hT v’xl.. .Vx, (Tuc(xl) A.. .ATuc(x,,) ~T~c(~,[x~,...,x,])) 
and we have to prove 
hT vxl,. . . .~&,,~&+I .v&+2 
(Tuc(x,) A...ATuc(x,,,) > (B.2) 
TacCfaflituc(7,[XI,...,Xnl,n,+~,xn+2))). 
Let al,. . . , a,,+2 be individual parameters of MT. From axiom (10) we prove in MT 
Tuc(~,,[al,. . . ,a,11 >TucCf~~~i~~c(~,[~l,...,~,l,a,+1,~,+2)) (B-3) 
From the induction hypotheses and (B.3) we prove 
Tuc( a, ) A . . . A Tada,,) > Tuccfallituc(~,[ul,. . . ,u,],u,+I,u,+~)). (B.4) 
We apply t’l to (B.4) and prove (B.2). 
B.5. Proof of Theorem 9.8 
pV and t, are defined inductively over the structure of sequent trees. In the base case, 
we have ?,, and t, such that (47) is Vx (T(x) > T(x)). Consider now the step case. 
We write (47) in the following form. 
V’x, . ..Vx. (T(xI) A...AT(x,,) AP;[x I,..., x,] >T(t,[xl,..., x,l))(BS) 
where?G[xt,... , x,] does not contain occurrences of T. We assume the hypotheses of 
(B.5) and derive Tuc(xl ) A. . .ATuc(x,,).From (29) weobtain Tuc(~,[xI,...,x,]). 
We can easily derive 
vx, . . .vx,, 7,[Xl,. . . ,&,I 
= if +ail( x1 ) A . . .A-d%d(x,,) APG[x~,...,x,,] 
then tp[xI,...,x,] (B.6) 
else fail 
From the assumption we derive -d%il( XI ) A. . . A -dM( x,) A P?: [ XI , . . . , x,] . There- 
fore we obtain r,[xt,. . .,x,1 = t,[xl,. . .,x,1 and thus Tuc(t,[xl,. . .,x,,]>, which is 
equivalent to T(t,[xl,. . . ,x,1) V t,[xI,. . . , x, ] = fail (definition (8) ) . From axioms 
(4)) (5) we easily prove that -+, [ x1, . . . ,x,] =fuiland thereforeT(t,[xt,...,x,]). 
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